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From Farm Income Support to Risk Management
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 2/24/12
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,   
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$112.00
152.22
129.31
169.90
80.76
91.77
172.50
361.89
$122.00
189.01
153.90
184.26
85.07
84.14
147.50
387.00
$127.70
186.21
155.22
195.42
86.71
85.76
       *
378.19
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.58
7.02
13.31
11.68
3.87
6.27
       *
    
       *
10.93
3.23
6.08
       *
       *
10.93
3.47
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
130.00
72.50
       *
204.25
68.75
250.00
137.50
100.00
206.00
71.88
225.00
145.00
100.00
212.50
74.00
*No Market
The debate over the next farm bill fired up in late 2011
when it looked like a closed-door-negotiated agreement could
become part of a grand budget-cutting plan put together by the
so-called “Super Committee.” But then, the Super Committee
failed to reach an agreement on how to cut the federal budget
deficit and the whole farm bill package failed to advance as
well.
Now, the work has restarted on the farm bill in 2012, with
even greater challenges. Questions remain about how big the
spending cuts will be, what direction the farm programs will
go, and even what the political climate and timeline will be for
a new farm bill to emerge from Congress. The process has
begun, with Senate Agriculture Committee Chair Debbie
Stabenow initiating a set of farm bill hearings that began at the
end of February. But the direction remains a major question.
Looking back at nearly 80 years of federal farm policy
provides some perspective on program design and direction. It
also illustrates how changing conditions and economic factors
eventually affect the design of farm policy, even if the changes
appear much more evolutionary than revolutionary, to use an
old adage of farm policy.
When the first farm bill was passed in 1933, the
fundamental policy goal was raising farm income. Average
farm household income at the time substantially lagged that of
non-farm households. Raising farm income was seen as both
an equity issue and an economic development issue, given the
economic dependence of so much of the country on
agriculture.
In 1933, the way to raise farm income was to raise farm
prices through price support programs that restricted supplies.
In an agricultural economy where imports and exports were a
small share of the market (particularly during the Depression
years), restricting supplies had the effect of pushing higher
prices onto consumers (including livestock producers) and
increasing income back to the farm. Commodity loan
programs, acreage reduction programs, marketing restrictions
and government storage programs all served to restrict supplies
Extension is a D ivision of the Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln
cooperating with the Counties and the U.S. Departm ent of Agriculture.
University of Nebraska Extension educational program s abide with the non-discrim ination policies 
of the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and the United States Departm ent of Agriculture.
on the market in an attempt to raise prices, and in turn raise
farm income.
These supply control/price support programs continued
for decades, but eventually became less effective in achieving
the goal of higher prices. The growing globalization of
agriculture meant that trade flows and world supply and
demand fundamentals drove price levels and not United
States domestic policies. When the “Russian Grain Robbery”
of the early 1970s occurred, it became obvious that the
traditional supply control programs were no longer effective
policy tools. Supporting farm income remained an important
policy goal, but the shift was beginning from supply
control/price support programs to income support programs.
While supply control/price support programs attempted
to restrict supplies to prop up prices, and thus farm income,
the new income support programs simply made direct
payments to producers to offset income losses when prices
fell below legislated levels. The first shift was the intro-
duction of the target price/deficiency payment program in the
early 1970s, shifting part of the safety net from price support
to income support. But some price support tools remained,
culminating in a run of low prices and burdensome supplies
building up in government stocks in the early 1980s. The
infamous Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program of 1983 was an
attempt to reduce production and simultaneously reduce
government stocks hanging over the market by paying
farmers in grain for acres not planted to a crop that year.
That led to the 1985 Farm Bill and a further shift away
from price support. Traditional commodity loan programs
were changed to a marketing loan, allowing loans to be repaid
at market prices (keeping grain moving in the private market),
instead of being forfeited to the government in lieu of
repayment (which previously had led to large government
stocks). Government stocks programs, including the Farmer-
Owned Reserve also disappeared, and acreage reduction (set-
aside) programs were finally eliminated in the 1996 Farm
Bill, meaning the government had finally gotten out of the
supply control business (not counting dairy programs, sugar
programs and the 30-million acre Conservation Reserve
Program).
The income support features of farm programs are still
in place today, at least for the price-based safety net tools
such as the marketing loan, the Counter-Cyclical Payment
and the Direct Payment. These tools seem irrelevant now,
given the current high price levels, but they were significant
components of the farm income safety net just a decade ago.
Then, with corn below $2 per bushel and soybeans below $5
per bushel, the income support programs provided the signal
to producers to keep producing when the market was asking
for less. So, while the effect of supply control/price support
programs was to restrict supplies to keep prices higher in the
market, the effect of income support programs was to
encourage production even when the market was already
saturated, keeping prices lower than would otherwise have
occurred.
While the income support tools still exist today, it appears
that farm policy is gradually transitioning to a new goal of risk
management. The Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE)
program added in the 2008 Farm Bill marked a major shift
from income support to risk management, with a revenue
guarantee tied to moving-average prices and yields. But, the
risk management era really began back in 1980, with
legislation that privatized crop insurance delivery. Additional
legislation in 1994 and 2000 substantially increased premium
subsidies and other incentives, propelling rapid growth in crop
insurance participation and protection. Now, with the increase
in crop prices and values the total crop value protected by crop
insurance is in excess of $100 billion. The expected
government costs for premium subsidies and company support
is currently about eight to nine billion dollars per year, making
it the single largest part of the farm income safety net at
present.
Looking ahead, it seems apparent that risk management
will be the primary focus of farm programs for the future. Not
only are the income support tools less relevant for today’s
prices, the general public is readily questioning the need for
income support at a time of record farm incomes and record
federal budget deficits. Agricultural groups have generally
recognized this need for a shift as well. In the midst of the late-
2011 debate and development of potential farm bill language,
many of the agricultural groups quickly developed and
released farm bill recommendations to the agricultural
committees. In general, those proposals recognized crop
insurance as the core part of the future safety net, with a
revenue safety net revised from the current ACRE program
added on to complement the insurance coverage. The
proposals also generally assumed the elimination of Direct
Payments, the $5 billion-per-year fixed payments to producers
that have become political target #1 in everyone’s deficit-
reduction plan.
A new farm bill with a farm income safety net designed
around crop insurance, a complementary revenue safety net
and a reduced or eliminated Direct Payment is clearly a safety
net for managing risk, not guaranteeing income. In today’s
high price - high income environment, market volatility, pro-
duction variability and resulting revenue risk appear to be the
greatest challenge for producers. The new farm bill and the
new farm income safety net may focus in on just this need and
continue the gradual evolution of farm policy in response to
underlying economic fundamentals.
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